The Heikal Papers: A Discourse on Politics and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser; Strategic Insights, v. 6, issue 4 (April 2005) by Aboul-Enein, Youssef
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2005-04
The Heikal Papers: A Discourse on
Politics and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser; Strategic Insights, v. 6, issue 4
(April 2005)
Aboul-Enein, Youssef
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School






The Heikal Papers: A Discourse on Politics and the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser 
Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 4 (April 2005) 
by LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN 
Strategic Insights is a monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
For a PDF version of this article, click here. 
Introduction 
Mohammed Hassanein Heikal is perhaps the most prolific and influential presidential chronicler in 
Egypt’s modern history. He has written many volumes on the Egyptian perspective of the Arab-
Israeli Wars and continues to write books that help Egypt’s intellectuals rationalize modern events. 
He has spent over five decades as a journalist, presidential confidant to Egypt’s presidents 
Nasser (1954-1970) and Sadat (1970-1981), as well as editor and commentator. Heikal had the 
unique opportunity to spend 10 hours with President Gamal Abdel Nasser on June 9, 1967, four 
days into the 1967 Six-Day War. Heikal’s interview represents Nasser unedited, as having a 
discussion with a close confidant (Heikal) as the 1967 war rages around him.  
Heikal was asked by Nasser to help craft his resignation speech that was later rejected by an 
Egyptian public that could not conceive of losing the charismatic Nasser—despite a military 
blunder that would enter the annals of history. It still remains a point of historical debate whether 
the rejection by the Egyptian public of Nasser’s resignation was orchestrated or not, but the 
Egyptian leader would remain President for three more years, until his death in 1970.  
This review will examine two of Heikal’s recent works. The first is a chapter titled, “10-Hours with 
Abdel-Nasser the Evening of June 9, 1967,” in his book Amm Min Al-Azamat  (Year of Conflict), 
part of the Heikal’s series Kalam Fee Al-Siyasa (Political Discussions), published in 2001 by Al-
Misriyah for Arab and International Publications [1]. The second book examined is Heikal’s 1987 
work Lee Misr La Lee Abdel-Nasser (For Egypt and Not for Abdel-Nasser) published in Cairo by 
Dar Al-Shirook Press[2]. The review essay of Heikal’s work will focus on exposing Nasser’s 
military-political thoughts and decision-making on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War. 
Nasser Discusses Field Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer 
When Heikal entered Nasser’s office at his home, he was on the phone with his Field Marshal 
Abdel-Hakim Amer—Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces and hereafter referred to 
in this essay as Amer—getting a report that Israeli units were crossing the Suez Canal westward. 
Responding to Heikal’s incredulous look at the news, Nasser and Heikal discussed how a real 
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war with the Israelis can begin, and that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was not equipped to 
handle urban and guerilla warfare as they make their way towards the Nile Delta. It became a 
three-way conversation with Amer that ended with Nasser telling the Egyptian Field Marshal 
simply to try his best to salvage the situation. After Nasser put down the phone, his first 
discussion with Heikal was his lamenting not dismissing Amer after his mismanagement with the 
union Syria led to the break up of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1961.  
Nasser believed that Amer had become a demoralized commander after that break-up that was 
due in large part to his treating Syrians as second-class citizens in this alliance and, moreover, 
using Syria as his own personal fiefdom. Amer was an incompetent military leader who rose from 
Major to Field Marshal politically and who focused on controlling the internal apparatus of the 
Egyptian government. The Egyptian leader reflected how the 1967 War was a repeat of the 1956 
Suez Crisis and that Amer had learned nothing tactically from the 1956 tripartite war with Israel, 
France and England. 
Discussion on the Sinai and Strategic Depth 
Both men then turned their discussion to the issue of strategic depth; Egypt had concentrated its 
forces in the Sinai along the border with Israel. Would it have been better to deploy forces closer 
to the Suez Canal giving army units access to shorter logistical support lines and more 
importantly a closer proximity to command and control located along the Nile Delta? This seems 
like a basic understanding of the principles of war, yet Amer chose pride and conceit by 
positioning air and land forces closer to the Israeli border where it was extended logistically and 
lacked cover provided by the hills and mountains of central Sinai.  
Nasser remarks to Heikal that this was the lesson that should’ve been learned in the 1956 War. 
Nasser comments that Field Marshal Amer had ordered a general retreat—on the morning of 
June 6th—after being overwhelmed by the shock of the Israeli air strike. Nasser lamented that his 
Commander-in-Chief could not even conduct a defensive action in the Sinai to buy political time 
to negotiate a cease-fire. Nasser complains that Amer hid losses from him and was in paralysis 
for three hours while his general staff looked into fighting a holding action in the Sinai. 
Nasser also discusses how the Egyptian media had contributed to the overall noise that made 
many, including Amer, underestimate the Israelis. Headlines blamed President Lyndon Johnson 
for conducting a campaign of economic, military and political pressure on Egypt. There were 
fantastic stories about how the United States had flown military stocks from Wheelus Air Force 
Base in Libya to Israel. Another story was that a U.S. aircraft carrier was off the coast of Port Said 
requesting permission to transit the Suez Canal; the Sixth Fleet carriers were actually 500 miles 
from the Israeli coast in the Mediterranean. In answering Heikal’s question of how Amer was 
caught so unprepared, Nasser rationalizes that Amer was caught unprepared in the 1967 War, 
because he relied heavily on United Nations Secretary General U Thant’s assurances that he 
would negotiate a two week moratorium between the parties—this left until 13 June at the latest 
before hostilities began, and that U Thant along with Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier 
Kosygin would enforce the UN’s efforts for a cooling period between Egypt and Israel. Nasser 
then tells Heikal that weapons could be replaced, but the troops would be more difficult to replace.  
Nasser on His Resignation and Words to Describe the 1967 Military 
Debacle 
During this ten-hour session with Heikal, Nasser discusses taking full responsibility for the 
debacle. Nasser initially discusses transferring power to War Minister Shams Badran, for the sake 
of the morale of the Army. Heikal is surprised by the choice and argues that Badran bears the 
taint of responsibility for the 1967 debacle and had no popular following among the Egyptian 
masses. Heikal was stunned to learn that Nasser had planned the transfer of power to War 
Minister Badran with Field Marshal Amer. This is revealing, for it shows a total focus on politics by 
Egypt’s top military officer and president and the abandonment of the battlefield. Nasser asked 
Heikal to help draft his resignation remarks that were then read on Cairo Radio on June 10th at 
7:43 pm to a stunned Arab audience. Heikal argued with Nasser, urging him to consider his 
options of possibly naming a transitory leader, but Nasser retorted that the Egyptian people were 
in too much shock to endure the constitutional process of a transitory leader and then potential 
elections. 
Heikal then turned to the subject of War Minister Shams Badran to succeed Nasser and argued 
that Vice President Zakariya Moheiddine would be a good successor. He was the oldest member 
of the Revolutionary Command Council that had created the current Egyptian Republic in 1952; 
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) accepted him; and he was also one of the closest Egyptian 
officials to the West. Nasser considered Moheiddine an unacceptable choice to Moscow and the 
Soviets would read too much into Moheiddine’s appointment. Nasser also tries to understand why 
the quality of the U.S.-Israeli relationship was not on par with the Egypt’s relationship to the 
Soviet Union? Nasser had to think about weighting the choice of Moheiddine or Badran as 
successor. 
The two men turned to discuss Nasser’s speech and what is fascinating about the Heikal papers 
is the selection of Arabic word Naksah (setback) to describe the 1967 military debacle. Heikal 
came up with Naksah and when Nasser asked about his choice of a singular word to describe the 
1967 War they went down the list of words Hazimah (defeat), Sadmah (shock), and Karithah 
(catastrophe) as well as the 1948 War that is called Nakbah (another Arabic dialect for 
catastrophe). 
The choice of words to describe a catastrophic military setback for Egyptian arms such as the 
1967 War was a matter of great importance. According to Heikal, Nasser was obsessed with the 
right description of this military defeat; he wanted to leave his successor enough political room to 
rebuild and place Egypt once again on the offensive. To describe the Six Day War as a Hazimah 
(defeat) would leave no room for reconstruction and would upset the Soviets who provided the 
bulk of the military hardware that Syria and Egypt incompetently deployed. He then blamed 
Lyndon Johnson for his defeat, accusing the United States of flying military hardware to Israel 
from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya. He informed Heikal of a letter he dictated to Syrian 
President Atasi, urging that he accept a cease-fire to save what remained of the Syrian Army. 
Nasser did not need to say more, for the Syrian Army needed to be preserved to suppress any 
internal threats that would topple the regime. Nasser then reflected on how the Soviets were likely 
to help Syria more than Egypt, how Moscow seemed to understand Baathism more than Arab 
Socialism. Heikal and Nasser then talked about Moscow’s need to preserve its gains in the Arab 
world at the expense of Washington. Nasser understood he could rely on using the Cold War to 
extract further military aid from Moscow. 
A more revealing aspect of Nasser’s thoughts during the Six Day War was his attempt at 
anticipating what Israel would do next that it controlled the Sinai. Among the options discussed, is 
that Israel: 
· pulls its forces from the Suez Canal zone and to the center of the Sinai to reinforce the 
passes.  
· reinforces the eastern side of the Suez Canal, thereby settling into a defensive mentality. 
(This was what the Israeli Defense Force settled on).  
· advances westward into Egypt proper and along the western towns of Ismailiah, Suez 
and Port Fouad which would have meant a form of warfare the Israelis are not used to, 
urban warfare.  
Heikal took Nasser’s first draft of his resignation remarks to Sami Sharaf, the presidential 
secretary; it was during this initial draft that Nasser had second thoughts of his successor, 
weighing both Shams and Moheiddine. Nasser made several decisions that night. He would 
choose Moheiddine to succeed him; he would not inform Field Marshal Amer of this decision and 
cut him out of national policy making; General Mohammed Fawzy would be appointed 
Commander-in-Chief to replace Amer; and Saharawy Goma’a would be named interior minister. 
When Nasser delivered his speech accepting responsibility for the 1967 War and offering to 
resign, the Egyptian and Arab street erupted in indignation and anger. To many in the Arab world, 
Nasser represented the first time they understood and identified with an Arab leader on a 
massive scale—his speeches made Arab nationalism, pride and history accessible to millions. 
Who Should Take Responsibility for the 1967 War? 
In analyzing Heikal’s second book, For Egypt and Not For Abdel-Nasser—and in particular, the 
author’s comments on the 1967 War—he attributes sole responsibility for the 1967 defeat of 
Egyptian arms squarely on Nasser. Heikal specifically justifies this statement on two policy 
decisions that Nasser took on the eve of the Six Day War. The first was declaring a blockade of 
the Gulf of Aqaba and Tiran Strait for ships bound for Israel; the second was leaving his 
Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Amer as Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces 
even after his dismal performance during the 1956 Suez War, and Amer’s inexcusable actions 
that led to the break up the of the union with Syria and the ending of the United Arab Republic. 
Heikal writes that Nasser and Amer did not listen to their General Staff that advised that it would 
take 15 years to absorb advanced Soviet military hardware into Egyptian formations. The earliest 
at which the Egyptian armed forces could be fully competent would be 1972—assuming the 
earliest major delivery of Soviet arms was in 1957. To say, however, that Nasser threw his forces 
into battle unprepared would be too simplistic, for he envisioned a gradual escalation with Israel 
on an economic and political front. Nasser relied on the superpowers, the greater Cold War and 
the UN to keep him out of a direct confrontation with Israel, while continuing to rattle his saber. 
Among the items Heikal brings to light from his interviews with Nasser and a deep study of his 
personal papers are: 
· President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to cease U.S. wheat subsidies to Egypt (Public Law 
480)—Nasser viewed this as an escalation of the economic war against his nation, and 
him personally.  
· Nasser believed the U.S. would step into the fray as its did in 1956—Nasser 
miscalculated that President Johnson would react like President Eisenhower should 
Israel exercise a first-strike option.  
· Egypt could not undertake a war with Israel with two crack divisions mired in the 1962-
1967 Yemen War.  
· Nasser did not listen to Jordan’s King Hussein, who warned of a conspiracy to bring 
Egypt into a war with Israel while Cairo was not ready.  
The Mythological Israeli Military Build-up Along the Syrian Front 
Anwar Sadat was in North Korea in early May 1967 as Speaker of Egypt’s Parliament and upon 
his return to Egypt stopped in Moscow. There, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny passed a 
message to Sadat for Nasser warning of Israel’s intent to deploy nine to eleven battalions on the 
Syrian border. That week, Egypt’s ambassador to Syria sent an urgent cable to Cairo of an 
imminent Israeli attack on Syria on May 22-26, 1967. Nasser dispatched the senior General 
Mohammed Fawzy to see the Syrian front for himself; he reported no Israeli build-up—yet Nasser 
put his faith in Soviet intelligence. The message from the Soviet Premier led to a series of action 
and reaction on the part of Egypt, the Soviets and other Arab states: 
· On May 13th, Nasser decides to deploy Egyptian forces into the Sinai. Nasser’s intention 
was a Muzahara (Military Demonstration).  
· Moscow assures Syria they can rely on Soviet military support up to and including direct 
military intervention.  
· Nasser advises Syria’s leader Atasi not to escalate with Israel or undertake a first strike.  
· Nasser intended to escalate gradually and made the decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba 
to ships bound for Israel. All members of his cabinet took this decision unanimously, and 
this activated Israeli military options to respond with a first-strike attack. The Israelis 
needed access to the Aqaba Gulf, as its port of Eilat was the chief port from where it 
received petroleum energy supplies from Iran (under a little publicized deal with the Shah 
of Iran).  
· Closing Aqaba meant the removal of United Nations (UN) observer force in Rafah, Taba 
and Sharm-el-Sheikh placed there after the 1956 Suez War.  
Nasser Places Too Much Hope on the UN and a Message from Lyndon 
Johnson 
On the eve of June 5, 1967, the first day of the Six Day War, Nasser had the following views 
firmly entrenched in his mind: He (Nasser) would maximize his effort to find a political solution to 
perceived Israeli and Syrian hostilities; by this time both nations fought an aerial duel in which the 
Syrians were badly defeated. The longer the crisis loomed, the less chance for war. Nasser 
completely disregarded his act of closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel, which represented to Tel-
Aviv indirect aggression on the nation’s economy and energy supplies. If Israel exercised a first 
strike option against Egypt, then Egyptian forces could conduct a tenacious defensive action in 
the Sinai. Nasser believed that the longer Israel remained engaged militarily, that in of itself could 
be translated into an Arab victory despite actual tactical defeats. The International Community, 
the superpowers and the UN will intervene to stabilize any crisis in the Middle East to avoid global 
escalation and restore global economic calm in maritime trade.  
Nasser also placed much hope in a message sent by President Lyndon Johnson urging all parties 
to cooperate with UN Secretary General U Thant in finding a solution to the crisis between Egypt, 
Syria and Israel. In addition, French President Charles DeGaulle sent Nasser a note urging him 
not to fire the first shot. On May 24th, U Thant met with Nasser and asked for a Moratorium on 
any further action by Israel, Egypt and Syria. Egypt would stop its reinforcement of the Gulf of 
Aqaba and allow third party ships to dock in the Israeli port of Eilat. All parties—Arab, Europe, 
Soviet and U.S.—would cease arms shipments to each side. The official letter sealing these 
terms arrived Cairo from UN Headquarters in New York on May 30th. Lyndon Johnson and 
Nasser agreed to a June 6th meeting with Egyptian Vice President Moheiddine in Washington. 
Nasser had no reason to suspect a first strike given the political progress of the crisis.  
Nasser Addresses His Armed Forces 
In light of the political developments, Nasser went to address the Egyptian General Staff on June 
2nd. He explained the progress of political talks and his confidence that Egyptian arms could 
absorb a first strike, and that it would then hold a defensive action in the Sinai. His Commander-
in-Chief Field Marshal Amer, despite some disagreements particularly among his air force 
commanders who argued that Egypt should conduct a first strike, reinforced this delusion. Some 
of the men in the room were military pragmatists who understood that once Egypt’s airpower was 
defeated, the ground forces would be useless. Add to this was a concern of Egyptian forces 
mired in Yemen and the incomplete absorption of, and training on, advanced Soviet weapons. 
Some Egyptian scholars of the 1967 war—Heikal included—seem to believe in a conspiracy of 
two policies within the U.S. government: one conducted by the State Department, and another 
more hawkish option exercised by the Central Intelligence Agency. The book offers no reference 
or archival material to support this conspiracy theory; add to this an Arab predisposition of 
misreading the U.S. interagency debate process in the formulation of American foreign and 
military policy.  
Conclusion 
On June 5, 1967, the Israeli Air Force struck a brilliant tactical first strike that within hours 
destroyed the air forces of Jordan, Syria and Egypt. Israel—within six days—had more than 
doubled its size, capturing the Egyptian Sinai peninsula, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the 
Jordanian-held West Bank to include all of Jerusalem. Egyptian forces, il- trained and without any 
plans or orders, executed a disorganized retreat. A panicked Field Marshal Amer gave the retreat 
order on June 6th—one day into the war. 
Heikal ends his assessment by drawing comparisons of the Six Day War to the retreat of the 
British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) from Dunkirk in World War II, and the U.S. defeat at Pearl 
Harbor in 1941. In the end, Egyptians were searching for answers—some found it in explanations 
from the recent past as demonstrated by the Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor examples of allied defeats, 
resulting in the end in the ultimate surrender of Germany and Japan. 
Others less educated in history abandoned Arab Nationalism and flocked to Islamic militancy. 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s number two and chief strategist, made the migration to Islamic 
militancy after the 1967 War. There is much to be learned from Arabic sources that help 
rationalize what is going on in the region, and why Arab leaders make certain decisions. 
American war colleges must begin a serious assessment of such works as Heikal’s in the original 
Arabic as U.S. forces become engaged in the Middle East. It is imperative that we study Arab 
military authors and writings by Islamic militants with the same zeal as Soviet doctrine was 
scrutinized during the Cold War. 
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